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THE END OF AN ERA: ASIA-A YEAR 
AFTER THE FALL OF INDOCHINA 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Pres:ldent, on 
April 10, 197.5, In an address to a Joint 
5ei!Sion. Preslden t Ford asked Congress 
to approve an additional $1 bUlion In 
military and economic aJd !or South 
Vietnam. The next day, American Em-
bassy personnel were evacuated from 
Phnom Penh. The end of an era was at 
hand. By the last o! that month-just a 
year ago-It was all over. In Saigon and 
Phnom Penh, the governments of Gen-
eral Thieu and Lon Nol were out and new 
goV!Ernments were ln. Thus ended the 
final chapter in the d~astrous policy to 
contain a nonaggressive China. 
Where do we stand in Asia a year 
later? What lessons have been learned 
!rom this attempt to interfere in vast 
lands &nd peoples hal! way around the 
globe? It Is time to take stock. 
Since former President Nixon's visit to 
Pekin&" in 1972, winds of change have 
blown throughout Asia. After more than 
two decades of hostlllty and confronta-
tion, the United States and China began 
the Journey to normalization of rela-
tions, a Journey far from completed. At 
last, our Nation's pollcy Is now grounded 
on the fact that the United States is not 
an Asian power but a Pacific power. The 
difference is more than ~~emantic. It Is 
the difference between a sensible accept-
ance of the realities o! Asia and the dan-
gerous llluslons of mllitary omnipotence. 
What takes place In this vast region Is 
of concern to Americans. But concern 
and control are quite dl.fferent matters. 
Simply stated, America's principal 
long-range interests in the Far East are 
to avoid domination of the region by any 
single power, to maintain friendly rela-
tions with China, Japan and other na-
tions, and to lessen tensions which could 
trigger either a local or a great power 
confilct in the area. 
Let us first look at the People's Re-
publlc of China, the home for one quarter 
o! the people on this globe. Former Presi-
dent Nixon's journey was only the first 
step on the path to normalization of re-
lations with China. The Shanghai com-
munique was not a document of flesh 
and blood. It was a skeleton to which the 
sinews were to be added by both coun-
tries. In the 4 years since that document 
was issued, some flesh has been added 
in the form of trade, cultural, educa-
tional and scientific exchanges and visits 
to China by government officials, Includ-
ing members of Congress. But the basic 
myth of the old China policy, the obstacle 
to normalization of relations with the 
People's Republlc o! China, remains. The 
United States, officiallY, still treats the 
governi!lent of Taiwan as the govern-
ment of China. 
The pertinent provision in the Shang-
hai communique reads: 
The Un1!«1 States acknowledgea that all 
Chinese on el ther side of the Talw&n Strait 
mnlntaln there Is but one Chin& &nd that 
Talwtm Ia put of China. The Un1ted Statee 
Government does not ch&llenge th&t pos1-
tlon. It roatllrms lte lnrere..t ·In a peacetul 
settlement or the Taiwan question by th& 
Chinese themalves. With this prospect In ·, 
mind.. It &tllrtns the ultlm&te objective Qt the 
wtthdr&wal of all U.S. force& &nd mtllt&ry 
lnst:allatlona trom Taiwan. In the meutln1e, 
It w1ll p~vely reduce Ita forces and mlll-
tary lnetall&tlona on Taiwan a.s the ten~lon 
In the area dlmln1shes. 
I interpret the Shanghai communique 
to mean that the United States recog-
nized that the Chinese civil war was over 
and that the eventual goal was full and 
formal Bormal!zation of relations be-
tween the People's Republic of China and 
the United States. 
President Ford said In Honolulu last 
December 7 that on hls recent visit to 
China, he "reaffirmed the determination 
of the United States to complete the 
normalization of relations with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China on the basis of 
the Shanghai communique." 
The Shanghai communique staLed 
that the United States would "progres-
sively reduce Its forces and military in-
stallation on Taiwan as the tension in 
the area diminishes." With the end of 
the war in Indochina, "tension in the 
area" wbJch, conceivably, could have 
Justified retention of U.S. forces on Tai-
wan ended. But there are still some 2,500 
American servicemen on that island, 
down from 10,000 in 1972. 
In addition to the regular forces, the 
United States maintains a military ad-
visory ml.!s1on to advise the Taiwan 
forces on how best to tight the forces of 
the People's Republic. We also continue 
to supply Taiwan with large quantities 
of weapom, •611 million worth over the 
last 4 years, much of that financed on 
long--term government credits. The ad-
mlnlstration proposes to sell $182.5 mil-
lion more in military equipment to Tal-
wan by the end of the next fiscal year, 
$43 mJII1on of that on credlt. 
Looking eastward, the partnership be-
tween the United States and Japan is the 
fundamental pillar o! American policy 
in Asia. Japan and the United States are 
military partners. Japan's continued 
trust in the validity of the U.S. secUl·ity 
co=ltment is essential to the mainte-
nance of stability throughout the region 
because a Japan embarked In search of· 
security on Its own by way of a major 
military expansion would unsettle all of 
Asia. Japan Is almost wholly dependent 
on foreign raw materials to supply Its 
greatly expanded Industrial plant. Asian 
memories of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere are still not forgotten. 
There are now pressures from the Penta-
gon !or Japan to exPand its m!lltary 
forces. I urge the greatest caution In 
pushing Japan in such a direction. There 
ought not to be grounds for Japan to 
have to doubt the US. security guaran-
tee and no compelling reason for the 
Japanese to make a significant change 
in their defense policy. Any other course, 
in my judgment, Is playing \':lth fire In 
the Western Pacific. 
I am deeply concerned about the fall-
out from the Lockheed afl'a!r on United 
States-Japan relations. This episode and 
other recent examples of payoffs In 
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shady American business deals abroad 
demonstrate the need for reforms inside 
this Nation and an international code 
of business ethics. This is an appropriate 
problem for the United Nations to tackle. 
Both buying and selling nations should 
·unite. to seek a remedy to cure the dry 
rot which now afflicts international busi-
ness dealings. 
As to the present situation. it is in the 
interest of all concerned that American 
and Japanese officials handle the prob-
lem in such a manner as to minimize the· 
adverse impact on our relationship. 
Maintenance of a close partnership with 
Japan should continue to have the high-
est priority in U.S. policy toward Asia. 
Korea, the last remnant of the failure 
of U.S. policy in Asia, is a time bomb 
whioh must be defused. The U.S. objec-
tive should be to bring about a settle-
ment between the two Koreas and, In 
the inte11m, to ease tensions and lessen 
the possibility for a resumption of hostili-
ties. U.S. policy should not be hostage to 
any particular government in Korea, or 
anywhere else for that mater. That les-
son should have been learned, finally, in 
Indochina and Cambodia where two gen-
erals, Thieu and Lon No! became the 
tail that wags the dog. Are we to suffer 
the same experience in Korea? 
Nearly a quarter of a century after the 
end of the Korean war, over 40,000 
American troops remain in Korea, at a 
cost to the taxpayers of $580 million 
annually. Many are on the DMZ line in 
positions which would automatically 
thrust the United States into the thick 
of the fighting should hostilities between 
North and South break out again. In-
deed, they are there for precisely that 
purpose-as a tripwire. U.S. nuclear 
weapons are also stored ·in South Korea, 
according to former Secretary of Defense 
Schlesinger, adding to the dangers of the 
situation. Our forces in this last bastion 
on the Asian mainland should be reduced 
over a period of time and all nuclear 
weapons. in my judgment, should be re-
moved. In the meantime, the United 
States should reexamine the tripwire 
ooncept at the DMZ. It may be that a 
more appropriate approach might be to 
seek to negotiate an even wider demili-
tarized zone. 
The United States must do more than 
it has in the past to break the impasse in 
Korea. We should have learned f.rom the 
long and costly efforts to contain the 
People's Republic of China that quaran-
tine is a reaction, not a substitute for a 
positive policy which seeks to solve a 
problem. It is in the interest of the Ko-
rean people, North and South, for the 
United States and world peace, that con-
tact be made between the two Koreas 
to help to minimize the risk of military 
clash and to facilitate an accommoda-
tion between North and South. 
Some months ago, the North Korean 
Government did make a move to estab-
lish a contact with South Korea through 
a meeting of the Red Cross organizations 
in both countries. 
According to the Christian Science 
Monitor yesterday, South Korea has 
proposed to the North an exchange of 
ancient art exhibits in what appeared 
to be a new initiative toward norma!iz-
ing relatio,ns. I would hope, Mr. Presi-
dent, that that trend would continue be-
tween North and South Korea. 
In Southeast Asia, the foremost task 
for U.S. policy remains to recognize the 
realities iii Indochina. The administra-
tion's policy of opposition to trade and 
commer~al relations with Vietnam or 
Cam'bodia, and the failure to send an 
Ambassador to Laos has something in 
it of the ostrich complex. The fact is 
that just as China was not ours to lose 
in 1949, neither was Indochina a quarter 
of a century later. That was not the 
tragedy for us. The tragedy was that the 
war was allowed to begin and to con-
tinue so long and that so many live~ 
were needlessly lost. 
Although the shooting war is over, 
economic warfare continues as a corner-
stone of U.S. policy. There is no way 
that a unilateral U.S. trade embargo 
ag-ainst Vietnam or Cambodia can be 
effective in a competitive world. Contain-
ment is not a policy. It is only a petulant 
reaction. It is time that the United 
States act toward the governments of 
Indochina, which have regained their 
independence, in a spirit which seeks 
to heal the wounds of war. Like it or not, 
a unified Vietnam, as North and South 
will ultimately become, will be a major 
force in Southeast Asia. It is in our long-
range interest to accommodate to this 
fact and make the best out of the new 
situation. 
I share the desire of all Amer.icans to 
learn whatever can be learned of the 
missing in action in Indochina. But we 
can hardly expect to do so by refusing 
to have anything to do with the new 
governments of Laos, South and North 
Vietnam, or Cambodia. The most effec-
tive way to obtain information about the 
MJA's, I should think, is through face-
to-face, on-the-spot official dealings. 
That is not likely without normalization 
of diplomatic and other relations. It is 
my understanding that the administra-
tion has decided to open talks With Viet-
nam on the range of issues between us, 
and that is certainly a step in the right 
direction. 
In Thailand, the United States faces a 
delicate situation. The question of a con-
tinued American military presence has 
become a major issue in internal politics, 
a further manifestation of the forces of 
nationalism at work in Southeast Asia. 
All U.S. forces, except for a small mili-
tary assistance group, have been ordered 
to leave the country within the next 
4 months, thus bringing to a close an 
attempt to maintain a second military 
toehold on the Asian mainland. The ac-
tion taken by the Kukrit government is 
both in their interest and in the interests 
of the American people. 
The closing of the U.S. bases may help 
to improve the prospects for an easing 
of tensions between Thailand and North 
Vietnam, an arrangement much to be 
desired. What the new Thai Government 
will do remains to be seen. 
The remnants of U.S. military involve-
ment, a smouldering insurgency in the 
northeast, a genuine fear of North Viet-
nam's intentions, and the continued 
existence of the SEATO treaty commit-
ment to Th¥land, the only country to 
which tb.e treaty has practical applica-
tiort, all add U.P to a sensitive and vola-
tile situation for the United States in 
Thailand. 
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there are 
no major policy problems. Burma con-
tinues to go its own way and Its govern-
ment has no desire to open its doors to 
large-scale foreign economic interven-
tion, by the United States or any other 
country. -There is in Burma, however , a 
danger that overzealous and costly pur-
suit of poppies may result not so much in 
the lessening of the supply of dangerous 
drugs but in involving this. nation in 
Burma's internal affairs and the con-
tinued fignt of the government against 
various Insurgencies. A close rein should 
be kept on antinarcotics activities, both 
there and elsewhere in the region. In 
the Philippines, the outstanding problem 
concerns the ·terms for continued use of 
the military bases at Clark and Subic 
Bay. Appropriate recognition of Philip-
pine sovereignty is the issue here. Nego-
tiations to meet this issue were begun 
yesterday between the two countries. I 
believe that a mutually satisfactory 
agreement can be reached, given the 
fact that we want to stay and the Phil-
ippine Government wants us to stay. 
United States-Indonesian relations are 
relatively trouble free. But this land of 
140 million people has a growing gap be-
tween rich and poor which vast amounts 
of foreign aid, new oil revenues, and out-
side investments seem only to have ac-
centuated. 
In both the Philippines and Indonesia 
the debacle · in Indochina, coupled with 
the change in U.S. policy toward China, 
has stimulated new interest in regional 
cooperation and a reappraisal of basic 
international relationships. As new re-
lationships evolve in Southeast Asia, a 
new spirit of self-reliance and regional 
cooperation is emerging. It is in our own 
interest to encourage and accommodate 
to this new spirit. One of the most prom-
ising developments is the growth of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
or ASEAN, con,prised of Thailand, In-
donesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Singapore. This genuinely local arrange-
ment, is showing much promise. Al-
though the recent summit meeting of the 
heads of state did not produce any start-
ling agreements, it did reaffirm a mutual 
desire to explore and develop common 
regional interests. Expanding its mem-
bership to include Burma and the na-
tions of Indochina, a future possibility, 
would result in a regionwide organiza-
tion of great potential. A regional zone 
of peace and freedom, encompassing all 
the nations of Southeast Asia, would be 
a giant step toward regional stability. 
"Those who cannot remember the past 
are condemned to repeat it,'' Santayana 
wrote. The era of military adventure on 
the Asian mainland is over. As a result 
of VIetnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the 
American people now have a more rea-
listic view of what, as a practical matter, 
we can and cannot do. They now know 
that it is not possible, or even desirable, 
to remake ancient cultures in our own 
image. There is a sober realization of 
the limits of America's resources and 
power. As was true of America in the 
past, the America of the future will be 
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tlle beacon to U1e world, not because of 
its military might or !oreJ.gll aid diplo-
macy, but becau.•e of what it stands for 
in furtilermg human aspirations for 
freedom and a better v.·ay of lilt' 
America Is not becoming Isolationist. 
There i~. In fact, a growing awareness of 
the Interdependence of the world and 
U1e !'Ced to tackle common problems on 
o. multilateral bMis. As U.N. Secretary-
Gen,ral Kurt Waldhelm put It in a re-
cent speech: "People are not turning 
away from Ideas of world interdepend-
ence. What U1ey ~tre turning away !rom 
are out-moded and un\\orkable ways of 
trying to deal with the world." 
In summary, I would sny that the U.S. 
position in Asia is more favorable than 
tt has been since the end of World War 
II. 
First. We enjoy good relations with all 
nations e-,;cept for North Korea and those 
in Indochina, which we Ignore by choice. 
Second. Both we and the nations o! tile 
region have a better understanding of 
what it takes to live In peace In a diverse 
world. 
Third. There Is no war. 
Fourth. American troops are coming 
home from the Asian mainland. 
Fifth. ThP economic burden of our 
overseas political involvement is lessen-
ing. 
There is an agcnd.t of unfinished busi-
ness, to be sure. But the problems are 
manageable. What is needed Is the will 
to clear away the remaining relics of out-
dated policies and to !nee up to the pres-
put ~nd the future and to lenrn from tile 
past. I will continue to do all I can 1n 
my remaining months in this body to in-
sure that work on t.hat agenda continues. 
Mr. President, I tlSk unanimous con-
sent that a SJ>eech I made on United 
States-Chinese relat10ns and a portion 
of a repm t which I made last August, re-
leased la<t October. entitled "Winds of 
Change" !nvoll·ing relations in South-
cast A. Ia be printed In tl1e RECORD. 
Thr·re being no obirction, tile maletial 
was ordered to be pr nted In the RECORD, 
as follow. · 
UNIT!-0 ST."t.r£SaCIJI..,.E:Sf RLLhl"lONS 
~lr. 1\i.<NsFIEI.D. l\lr. Presl<.lent, I llstened 
to former Secretary of Defense James St·hle-
slnger on a program ye,terday, and he wa;; 
asked some questions about the People's Re-
publlc o! C'hlna As I recollect, he stated that 
he and some othef' hnd discussed the possi-
bility o! armo !or the People's Republic but 
that nothing bad come ot it. I Msumed. uased 
on his lan~uage, that that discussion wn.s en-
tirely w!lhln tho U 6 adm!ntstr:\tlon and 
thl\t the People's R<publlc represent·•t!ves 
were not I volved nnd thnt It wns something 
thnt Nao <lone In relation to po s! >1lltles 
whlch rntcht ro ncelv ~hl\ ensue Rt owP fu-
ture time 
Secretory Scllle .n er also \\ n uuked 
v.·heth r he \\OUld appro\e the sc,>dlng o! 
Mms •o the People's Republ!c. H~ snl,l, In 
rfTect, "We "Ill have •o race thnt question 
v.·hen It ar "' , but I think It •"" 1ld be 
treoa.tt"d o .. 'l t'te same \:luis As t e Soviet 
un~on" 
I t >o, tlhnk thnt t"e P ople Republic 
•honld be trentcd on the same bas,, ns the 
Soviet Unlou F'urt more. I "ould !Ike to 
see a mo t-! vorecl-n ion treaty executed 
between Peking and Wu.•hlngton. I believe 
that tr we ~re going to C<trther normn112e re-
lations. ttst Is one ot the steps we should 
take, though I do nc.t ~Heve that 'IH' sho\lld 
ln lillY aense, In any way, In any shape, In 
any form, try to force arms on Pelting. 
On.e, It will be counterproductive; two, 
I do not thlnk there have been &ny con-
tacta With Pektng tn tb.&t reepeet; three. I 
believe tbat the Ohtneee look upon them-
&elvee aa betng perfectly ca]J<'ble o! prodl>~!ng 
tb.elr own armament. 
The Secretary al90 tndlcated tba t so far 
as nuclear weapons were concerned. we were 
not bebtnd the Soviet Union. In that re-
spect, It Is my understanding that Peking 
has not been accelerating Ita nuclear pro-
gmms but bas continued to maintain a 
oteady pace Bnd only !or de!eru!lve purposes. 
He <lid Indicate that we were behind tn con-
ventionAl. forces, which I 1188UJne to mean 
ln!BntlT, the Army, ships, seapower, the Navy. 
But I potnt out that we do have more than 
2 million men under ar11l8, scattered In too 
many parts ot the world, stationed there !or 
too long and at too great a co&t. 
I was interested in the Secretary's refer-
ence to the People's Republic, because I think 
this Nation bas been paying too little at-
tention to the nat!olll! across the Pac!.t!c. I 
point out that, as tar a.a the People's Republic 
Is concerned, It bas somewhere between 850 
Bnd 90 mUUon people, practically one-quarter 
o! the population of the globe. 
At the other end of Asia, I point out that 
Saud! Arabia, wlth an estimated 7 mtlllon 
people, )las approximately one-fourth of the 
o!l reserves In the world. So I hope we shall 
pay more attention to that part of the globe, 
recognize Ita significance a.a !ar as we are 
concerned, and be aware o! the potentials 
whlcb may arise !rom time to time. We 
should keep our eyes and our ears open, so 
tha.t we wUI not place undue stress on other 
parts o! the world at the expense of our 
relations with the Asian Continent. It Is 
Important that we better understen<l what 
transpires tn that part of the world. 
Getting a little bit closer to home, I 1\rn 
glad to note tba.t on today, negotiations are 
beginning between the RepubUo o! the Ph!l-
lppines Bnd the U.S. Government relative 
to the future status o! our bases In the 
Phll!pptne Republic, notably at Sublc Bay 
and Clark FJeld. I have no doubt that those 
negotla.ttons wUI be successful. It w1ll·'take 
a Uttle give and take on both sides, but 
because o! the Inherent friendship and the 
deep necessity for malnta.lning these bases, 
I feel quite certain that, before too long, 
an amicable settlement wUJ be reached 
which will satisfy both the Phll!ppine and 
the American people. I wlsh to Include at 
this point In the RECORD an excerpt o! a re-
port which I made to the Foreign Relations 
Committee tn October 1075. The excerpt deals 
with the Phll!pplnes and the question or US. 
mUit.ary bases In that country. 
\\~l!'.;DS OF CHANGF.-EvOLVING RELATIONS AND 
lNnHE.STS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
I. THRU VARIA'IIONS ON NEUTRALlSM 
Pres!del>t Nixon's visit to Peking In 1972 
released strong winds or change ln the In-
ternational relnt!onshlps o! Asia. The col-
lapse In South Vietnam and Cambodia In-
tensified these currents. Visible changes al-
·earty Include the restoration ot contMt 
between the United States Bnd China look-
Ing ln the direction o! normalcy a.fjer many 
years of acrimonious confrontation. This 
shtrt has been a key !actor In enabl!ng us to 
reduce the US. military pre..ence In Asia 
from oome 650.000 at the height of the Indo-
chlnn war to les.• than 60,000 at present. 
1\foreover, a further reduction wUJ take place 
In the months ahead n• US !orces are-" lth-
drawn from Thailand. 
U.S. policy, In short, Is beginning to re-
flect the !act that the United States ts a 
Pac!.t!c nation, but not a power on the Asian 
Mainland. The waters of tho Pac!.t!c touch 
the shores o! the United States on the West 
Coast. at Hawaii, Alaska, the territory of 
Quam an4 .the Us. trust territories. 'lbev 
alSo beat agatnst the coastlines o! sevet1 
nations to which we have made security com-
mltmen~apan, South Korea, Taiwan, the 
Phlllpplne•. ThaUand, Australla and Nrw 
Zealand-as well as the shores o! the Soviet 
Union and China. What takes place In this 
vast region Is o! deep concern to this nation 
However, concern and capacity to lnflu~nrt 
are quite dUTerent. What we began to per-
ceive In Korea and saw very clearly In Indo-
china Is that our capnclty to Influence the 
flow or history on the Asian Mainland 1tsel1 
Js qutte limited on tho bMis or any rational 
input or manpower and resources 
After the birth Of the Peoples RepubliC Of 
Chtna In 1949, we establlshed a policy ot 
containment tn Commur.tst China. It was a 
policy which sought to line up nations on an 
either "!or or against" ba..•ts with "neutral· 
IBm" regarded as something to be apUl'Ded. 
A ring o! treaties wns engineered In an ~trort 
to use u.s. power and Influence to choke off 
what were held to be China'• aggressive de-
signs on Ita neighbors, In SoutheMt Asia, 
both Thalland and the PhU!pplnes linked 
their foreign pol!cy directly to what became 
a U.S. crusade against communism on the 
Asian maiiUand. Burma and Cambodia, each 
In Its own way, tried to walk the tight rope 
of non-involvement. The !ormer did so 
throughout the Indoch!t>a war, In part, by 
reJecting U.S. and other forms of foreign 
ald. Under Prince Norodom Slhanouk. Cam-
bodia also l!eld the line o! non-Involvement 
succeesfully for many years. When the Prince 
was overthrown by a milltary coup, however, 
the Khmers paid the cost In five yenro of 
bloody war. The overthrow of Slha1touk al•o 
added more U.S. cnsnalt!es and blll!ons to 
U.S. costs Jn Indochina as this nation went 
!rom non-Involvement to the aid of the sur· 
cessor m111tary regime In Phnom Pehh. 
Through Southeast Asia, nations are now 
making major ~easM•6smenta of their rela-
tionships. Nationalism and neutrality, mixed 
with a buddlng Interest In regional coopera-
tion, are the driving forces at work. Neu-
tral!sm takes on different characterl.,tlos In 
each of the Southoo.•t Aslnn nations. Bnrma 
Is a study of trad!t!onnl neutrality with !• 
heavy a.coent on Isolationism. ThaUand, the 
only nation tn the region to remnln free o' 
colonial rule before World War II. Is enga~ed 
In writing another chapter In Ita long history 
of seeking to balance Its Independence amidst 
shl!ttng political currenta. Three decade• 
att~r close ai!nement with and vestigial d•· 
pendency on the lJn!ted States, the Republic 
ot the Ph111pp!nes 18 moving Into the more 
open waters o! International relations and 
accelerating Ita etrorta to achieve a !ully 
Independent Identity. 
As new relationships evolve In Southcn>l 
Asia, naw problems are emerging among the 
nt\tlons In the area and In their relations 
with the United States. Changes In !Ill old 
order always carry a degree of paln!ul adJust-
ment. It Is to be hoped, however, that out 
of the old, eventually wUI emerge a new 
spirit o! sel!-relte.nce and regional coopera-
tion. In that fashion, the Independent na.-
tlons o! the region may be able to lh·e 
together In a wne of peace respect td by all 
o! the great powers. That Is the goal towards 
which each nation vtB!ted, In Its own way 
and to some degree, all or them together, 
S<'emed to be moving 
The Asian nations are very likely to call 
!or adjustment& o! all o! the relationships 
with the West which grew out or a previous 
state o! dependency. We should do our be• t 
In our own interesta to accommod:1.te to 
changes o! this ktnd. They Involve, In many 
cases, as tn Indochina, the lightening oi an 
excessive and one-sided burden which hM 
been maintained !or decadee by the people 
or the Unite<! States. From our own point 
of view, It would bo desirable to subJect the 
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Southeast Asia CollecL!ve Defense Treaty, the 
so-called Manlla Pact, to cntlcal reexamina-
tion. The treaty seems to me or little rel-
evance to the security of this Nation in the 
contemporary situation.' In fact, it may be 
more a !labllity than an asset to all of the 
slgna.tories. As for our relations with Indo-
china,.it would seem to me helpful in dealing 
with the vestige.! problems of the war and 
in paving the way for a peaceful future to 
establish direct contact with tile successor 
governQit.:nts in Vietnan1 and Can1hodia at 
au appropriate tin1e. 
It would be unfortunate if out of iuctq;na-
tion or disillusionment we should turn our 
backs on Asia. More iu line with our intcresLs 
would be to seek io understand rnore dearly 
what is transpiring on that continent. Our 
young people, in particular, need as 1nuch 
exposure a...~ possible to the changes in Asia 
since they wlll experience in the years ahead 
most of the consequences. Through diplo-
macy nne! cultural contacts we should be able 
to harmonize our reasonable national in-
terests in security, trade and cultural cross 
fertilizati :>n with the emerging situation in 
Southeast Asia. Tile present transition need 
not be a source of anxiety If it is appro,.ched 
in that fashion. Indeed, we could be on the 
"erge of a new era wll!ch could bring great 
benefits both to the Asian countriP.s and to 
this Nation. 
II. DUHMA 
Neutrality and nonalinerncnt 
Under President Ne Win, Burma has navi-
gated a course of neutfalism and nonnline-
ment for many years. Its relations with the 
great neighboring states of China and India 
nre correct and formal o.nd the san1e i.s trne 
for the Soviet Union and the United S,ates. 
Burma has no intimates and seeks no.ne. It 
has sought to avoid foreign entanglerrents. 
Although it was an early mem~er ol the 
United Nations, only in 1973 did the nation 
even join the World Bank and the Asian 
Development B:p1k. In the United Nations 
and othe:;r international forums, Burn1a ha.c; 
abstained on many divisive issues. For 'ears 
it has recogni~ed both Koreas and borh Viet-
nams. 
Burma was an observer of what. hflpr:ned 
to the Indochinese nations when they were 
drawn in to great powe:r rivalries. Their tragic 
experience was such as to provide proof to 
the Burmese government of the correctness of 
its own policy. Whatever its shortcon1ings, 
this policy has served to keep Burma out 
of the conflicts which have b eset otf>ers in 
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Isolated by 
natural n1ountain barriers on the east, west, 
and north the Burmans have been able to 
preserve to a greater degree than 1nosc na-
tions ln th~ region, tbeir traditional culture. 
Speculation in Bmmu is to the effect that 
tts doors nHty soon open wider. evidencing, 
some say. a. change in atutude toward s the 
outside world. One Bunnc~e official obst:rved 
to me, however that what has happened is 
"not that Burma has changed but that the 
world has changed." He went on to explain 
that a U.S. pollcy of detente with the Soviet 
Union and the new U.S. relationship with 
China slgnlficantly altered the framework of 
Burmu's neutralism and made foreign con-
tacts, n o:nblv with the United States, more 
feasible. · 
Foreign ohservers, when discussing Burn1a's 
economy, generally describe it as "stagnant" 
or "sick." Whlle it Is obvious to a visitor that 
there Is a great deal o! poverty, the u sual 
economic J. o.rdsticks are not exact or even 
very relevant when applled to a rice-based 
agrarian society. 'I11c extremes of poor and 
rich, for ex'lmple, are not seen in Bmm.a as in 
m.a.ny other countries.· Burma's econmny 1s 
not rocketing ahero.d but neither as in Indo-
china has the land been devastated and hun-
dreds of thousands k!lled and maimed by 
warfare. Also avoided so fur have been the 
cultural upheavals and environmental de-
spoilation which are often associated with 
economic development via h.e&vy )nfluxes at 
outstde·-cap!tal and !orelgn ald. 
Nevertheless, there are inani!estations of 
polltlcal d l9S8ti•faction from time to time 
wJPch center in Rangoon and are probably 
directed in part, at least, at the lack of eco-
nomic progress and· opportunity. Three 
major anti-government demonstrations by 
workers and students have occurred during 
the last year and a half. Colleagues and uni-
versities have been closed from t!q>.e to time 
and leaders of workers demonstr~ttons have 
been sentenced .to long prison terms. 
Although a new Burmese Constitution was 
adopted las.t year, the governn:utnt remains 
based on army leadership. Sixteen of 18 cabi-
net officers are military or ex-military 1nen. 
While farming Is st!ll on a private basis, as 
are nu~ ny shops and stores. the government 
runs much of the rest of the econO!llY· 
Staples, such as rice, oil, and cloth are ra-
t!onecl, with scanty allotments. This system, 
plus a shortage of consumer goods generally 
undergirds a so-called "shadow economy" or 
black m~rket. Although stable untll the last 
year or so, prices are now rising. Rice stocks 
available for export, ~he country's principal 
source of foreign exchange, are dwindling 
due to lacl< of substantial increases in out-
put coupled with population growth. In the 
last thirty years, the population has almost 
doubled to 30 million. The government is 
considering new Incentives to raise rice pro-
duction and recefit!y Increased the price 
paid to the farmer by ·30 percent. As yet, 
however, policies have not been devised to 
surmount the dllemma o! a dwindling per 
capita food supply as against what Is seen 
as a possible loss o! security and national 
identity which might be occasioned by lim -
iting population growth in the midst of 
towering neighbors. 
One way to help alleviate this dllemma, 
at least !or the inlmed!nte future, would be 
by the discovery o! petroleum in exportable 
quantities. After years of rejecting private 
investment, last year, Burma leased offshore 
tracts to two American on companies, Exxon 
and Clcies Service, and two companies from 
other countries. While the drilling has not 
yet yielded results, the Burmese believe the 
prospects are good. Burn1a is also seekin:;: 
by Its own efforts to extend present onshore 
oil fields which supply 70 percent of the 
nation's modest current needs. The govern-
ment has not shown any Interest In foreign 
Involvement in the exploration for minerals, 
with which, according to technlca! reports, 
Burmo. is generously endowed.l 
A part o! Burma's imports are presently 
being financed by loans from the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank and by 1>1-
lateral agreements with West Germany and 
Japan. Three small Asian Development Bank 
projects are now underway. While the U.S. 
had not provided new dollar assistance to 
Burzna since 1963, a consortium arrangement 
uncler the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund which involve foreign aid 
contributions by the United States, Japan, 
and Western European countries is under 
con"ideration. 
The Burmese are in the process o! repair-
ing the severe damage caused by an earth-
quake in early July at Pagan, an area of his-
torical ""gnificanoo and the site of numerous 
edifices and shrines dating from the 11th 
Century. They are hampered by Jack of funda 
which are being rnlsed through public sub-
scription. Various nations have made con-
tributions through their embaaslee in Ran-
goon for this very worthwhile endeavor. 
Shortly before I arrived, U.S. Embassy offi-
cials had asked Washington for permL<slon to 
make a small monetary contribution to as-
sist in the repair o! the damage at Pagan. 
The request was denied, apparently on some 
semantic or obscure basis and the matter 
was buffeted from pillar to post in the bu-
Footnotes at end of article. 
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It ·)s amazl.ng to find that In an . rf! , 
Eltecu.tl · l!lraneh which frequently finds 
ways unknown even to the Congress to rush 
!>ens of tnll.llbns m &1i:i to shore up a sinking 
reglnle as 1n the closing days of the Cam-
bod!a.n dQbacle, is un•ble to find a basis for a 
modest human .gest\U'e in the face of a nat-
ural d.iaa.ste!' such. as~ occurred in Burma last 
summer. One can only note that if more au-
thority l:S necessary to a:ct inn situation su~'' 
as thts, why has It n~ long since rcen re-
quested? . 
Thfti.drug trade and tnsurecnts along the 
Bumaese·border create a dangerous mixture. 
Twenty groups, most of them basecl on eth-
nic divls.ions and some. quite small and of 
little contemporary significance, are now ln 
various degrees of insurrection or insubcr-
dinatlon with regard to the governm~nt in 
Rangoon. It is possible to dlvlcle the factions 
lnto flhreo basic groupings. The first type 
seeks to replace the existing government and 
is exem.plifled by the Burma Communist 
Party. the largest single dissident element. 
Typl.fl~ by the Kachin Independence Army 
(KIA), & second group seeks autonomy in 
ethnic areas.. The third consi&ts sinlply of aut-
and-out drug traffiCkers and bandits, some 
of whom are remnants or descendants of the 
forces associated with the National Govern-
ment which fled from China in 1949 and 
which, for a tinle, were supported from Tai-
wan. 
Opium IS a traditional crop In the hill area., 
of Northeast Burlna. It ls estimated that the 
crop may reach 440 metric tons this year 
even though the priCe is currently depressed 
because o! the loss o! the Soulli Vietnamese 
market. All the Insurgent groups are belleved 
to be financed, at least in part, through the 
drug traffic. The Chinese (Nationalist) Ir-
r<'gu!ar Force which is stlll organized into the 
3rd and 5th divisions is the most importnm 
group involved in the drug traffic. Another 
element is the Shan United Army, which op-
erates in the Northern Shan states. 
Each organization has its own "turf" in th•· 
remote and scarcely accessible border area;~ 
as well as its own methods of operations. In 
simpl!fied form, the cycle of operations, runq 
as fo11ows: the trafficker buys the crude opi-
um from the grower, transports it to the 
Thai border, sells it, uses the proceeds tu 
buy arms or other goods, brings the arms anct 
goods back Into Burma, sells them on the 
black market. The cycle Is completed whet• 
the proceeds fr<:nn the black Inarket sale.:; nrt· 
used to buy n1ore opiuin. 
The Burmese governn1enL is conc1. ··11 ·-:I 
with the drug traffic both because of tM• 
growing consumption of drugs in the cvvn-
try and because suppression of the t rade 
is seen as an essential element in dealing t.f-
fectively wlth tile insurgency problem. Af r 
an initial reluctance, Burma has agTeed lo 
accept eighteen helicopters which are av3 ,_ 
able under the U.S. narcotics control IJr,•-
gram. Four hellcopters have been deli. en· J, 
on a trial basis, and, if results are mutual!•: 
satisfactory. the remainder will be turrl'·d 
over, in due course, to the Burmese govern-
ment. 
In addition to thi6 arra.nge1nent, !.here D. avE:' 
been some small Burn1ese purchases of U .S. 
ml!ltary related goods. The Burmese gov-
ernment, however, ha.s indicated no interP-:::t 
in renewal of a military aid progra1n or in 
obtaining mll!tary training for its forces Ill 
the Un1ted States. 
A note ol caution is indicated in regard to 
cooperation in drug suppres"ion. 'l'he zeal 
o! U.S. enf,orcement officials in trying to get 
at the. source• of drugs is understandable and 
merits much applame. Nevertheless, there 
are oth•r questions involved in Burmese-
U.S. relatk>ns. For too long in the admlnis-
trat,lon of U.S. pol!c.les, we have tended to 
assume reepons!bllity for problems which are 
mare properl;r those of other na t!ons or o! 
the International community. One form o! 
involvement !n the Internal affairs o! other 
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nations can lead very rapidly to other form•. 
aa the bitter Indochina experience ehould 
have taught us. 
In my judgment. therefore. any rurt!'.er 
U.S. 1\SSlstance to tore1gn countrlee for their 
internal UMJ in anti-drug probletn3, 1t war-
ranted at all. would eeem more appropriately 
to be funneled through International bodies. 
Whatever funds Congress thinks justified for 
thls ac lvlty might weU go as a contribution 
to the U.N ·a Narcotics Cor .. trol program. 
~1oreover, any activity or U.S. narcotics 
asents In Burma or any other nation In 
SOutheast Asia, for that matter. must remain 
under the strict supervision and ftrm con-
trol of the U S Amb,\&iador who Is In the 
be>t position to know what practices are or 
are not possible In the light or our total 
relattonsblp with ti. e country concerned. 
After my vis! t to Burma six years ago, I 
v.-rote: '"The Burme!'e go\•er'nment continues 
to go Its own way as It has for many years. 
It is neither overawed by the proximity o! 
powerful neighbors nor overimpressed by the 
virtues o! rapid development through IarKe 
in!u.slons o.t foreign aid. Burma's primary 
concern Is the retention of 116 national and 
cultural Identity and the development of an 
economic system preponderently by Its own 
efforts and along 116 own lines." 
These are still the major pre-occupations 
of the Ne Win government. The nation has 
succeeded In maJnt!llnlng Its national and 
cultural Identity. It,< economic situation. 
however, is sttll very tenuous. 
As for our rclatlons v.lth Burma, whllc 
some strengthening of cultural and techni-
cal exchange either on a bllateral or multi-
lateral bn.,ls may be desirable and possible. 
my view I tho.t we would be well-advhed 
to avoid scrupulously any Inclinations 
towards a deepening tuvohement in Bur-
mel'e affairs. Such lncllnations wouJd not 
be welcomed in Burma as h· Its best inter-
ests. Clearly. too, they would not be m the 
best Interests or this nation. 
111. TliAll.ANO 
After four decades of Intht.uy rule. Thai-
land Is attempting anew to forge a demo-
cratic system. At the same time, there Is 
underway a major revtstotl in foreign rela-
tionships. Followtn~: student uprisings, In 
O<:tober 1973. the ml11tary government of 
Field Marshall Thanom Klttlkachorn was 
ousted and Thanon1 and other government 
leade., fied the country. ThlR development 
coupled with the rapidly changing situation 
In Asla, initiated by Pr.,ldent Nixon's trip 
\o Peking, and culminating In the collapse 
In Indochina, has brought about a sweep-
Ing reappraisal by Thailand of lt. foreign 
policy 
Until the fall of I he Thanom government, 
Thailand had maintained a close relatlon-
shlp--tJOme termed It a "client-state·• rela-
tionship-- with the United Stales. Now that 
has chan~ed, with Thailand moving away 
!rom the long luthnacy with the United 
States and, at the same time. seeking better 
relations" lth Its neighbors In Indochina and 
Asia, How this land of H m1lllon people 
handles the turn towards polltl<'al democracy 
and a new foreign policy will have far-reach-
ing consequences tor the over·all rela.tiou-
ohlps In and around the Asian continent. 
Political and e1·onomtc situation 
Prime Minister Khukrlt Pramot, lender of 
the SOcial Action Party, has ~overned Thai-
land slnte mld-!\!arch with a coalltlon of 
eight parties. His own party. wlth only 18 
seats, Is " dlstant third in terms of party 
strength In the Parliament. Whlle the Thai 
King. Phumlphon Adunytld.et, serves pri-
m rlly as the symbol of national unity, the 
monarchy t., otlll a !actor In state aft'alrs, 
particularly, In times of crisis. The present 
Thai pollt•ct\l system Is based on a Parl1a-
ment conslstlng of 269 seats In an elected 
Lower Honse and a 100-nlember appointed 
Upper House. Elections earlier this year at-
tracted •2 parties and 2,191 candidates. Pre-
dictably, the results were lnconclualve. 'There 
are now representatives !rom 23 parties sit-
ting tn the Parliament which, when I visited 
It, we.s meeting In a joint session and en-
gaged In spirited debate over an aspect of 
ABEAN. Despite earlier predictions of a short 
and unhappy life, the Parliamentary struc-
ture Is managing to hold together and Is 
aervtng as o. vehicle for operative govern-
ment. 
The Khukrlt cabinet. apart trom the dlm-
cultles Inherent In any coalition and, espe-
cially In one emerging from the trauma of 
an abrupt shift !rom military authoritarian-
Ism, Is subject to three basic pressures; a 
volatUe student movement; long-standing 
Insurgencies In the north, the northeast and 
south; and the ever present posslblllty of 
a mllltary coup. 
The student lDOVement wields ln6uenre, 
as ls often the case In Asian nations, !a.r 
beyond numbers. There Is a working rela-
tionship between the students and labor on 
most Issues and thi• coalition constitutes 
the m06t potent force In current Thai poll-
tics. It may be less or a !actor, however, than 
It was two years ago at the time of the 
ousting of the dlctator<hlp. Public reaction 
In Bangkok to pa.st exce:;oes, It Is said, has 
caused student leaders to be more dis-
criminating tn choosing is.~ues on \\-hich to 
exert their pressure. 
One personal incident was Instructive. 
When I arrived for an appointment vath the 
Prime ~'lirllster. hundreds or out or work 
Thai guards 1lt U.S. military basee. who are 
being discharged as the bases are phased out, 
were engaged tn a demonstration detnand-
ing !Ina! pay adjustments. The guards were 
not on U.S. payrolls but. rather, wer.e paid 
Indirectly on the basts of U.S. contracts "lth 
Thai mllltary leaders of the prevlO\IS rogltne, 
some o! whom apparently have fled the 
country. Since the demonstration wns taking 
place In front of the Prime Minister's offices. 
It was necessary to postpone the meeting 
lest the presence or a vlsltln~ American otll-
clal trigger more serious dtt!lcultles. 
Ever present In the background of Thai 
politics Is thl' potential for a military coup. 
While the government appeaM to command 
the loyalty of the armed forces. rumors of 
possible coups abound In Bangkok. PerhspA, 
the principal deterrent Is the public revul-
tlon with the rampant corruption or the 
previous mllltary regime and thO" posslblllty 
that a coup at this time would B!l1'1n bring 
on a mUltant student-labor reaction. 
The role of the mllltary has been deem-
pha.sl.zed by the prese'lt government which 
a.ppea.rs to want to dire-ct tts energies to-
ward socl!\1 and economic- needs. Heretofore 
1nuch of the go\'ernment's interest cen-
tered on Bangkok With 4 million people, 
Bangkok Is Thalland's only major city and It 
1s scarcely repretientat1ve or the nation The 
gap between Bangkok a~:d the reM or the 
country ts great. Per capita Income In the 
capital, for example. Is $BOO· per year but 
It Is only about e200 nationally, and It Is, 
perhaps, not more than e75 per yeur 111 the 
m06t troublesome Insurgent area, the north-
east. There ha.s been llttle spread of com-
merce and Industry !rom Bangkok to the 
countryside. The city, In some respects, Is 
llke a !orel'(n land to mOflt Thais. Its tramc 
j.•ms, westernized practices and political 
ma!leuverlng are quite alien to the vlllagere 
who make up the va.st majority of the 
country's population. 
Neglect of the vUlages Is a major ractor In 
fueUng the Insurgency movements. In t.he 
north the Insurgents are ethnic groups often 
Involved In the drug tramc. In the northeast 
the problem is peuant dJ.scontent and Thai 
against Thai. In the eouth. It 1.8 largely Malay 
Muslim or Chinese against Tha.lB. 
Over the yee.rs, there have been any num-
~r of antl-4nsurgency oampe.lgna launched 
by Bangkok, all llberally financed wl h US. 
funds a.nd, often, abetted with advice from 
varloue U.S. agenc11111. None has brought an> 
appreciable results. 'lbe Insurgent movement<~ 
have continued to grow, with a total of pe"-
haps 8,600 now under arms ln. the narthea t 
&lone. The Khukrlt government t>eem.s to be 
aware that the problem cannot be aolved 
unl068 thel"e ts more etiecttve rontact be-
tween s heretofore ren1otR government tn 
Bangkok and the people In the locallt!es. It 
Is trying n.ew ap.proe.ches which Include a 
rorm or r&venue sharing to channel funds to 
the poorest areM. Al>lo reoogmzed Is the ne<d 
to change tl:le attJtudes of the umlerpt\ld and 
oorrupt bu.-eaucracy In the Insurgent areas 
While \t may be difficult to peroii<Hie wldler. 
and pollee who have ren.ped much of the 
financial benefit o! pMt antJ-lnsur• ent cam-
paigns to beoome benefactors or villager;, 11t 
least an eft'ort Is being made to brmg about 
a reorlenta.tJon. The government"6 five year 
plan al90 empha.slzee economic gro" th In the 
rural a.rea.a a.nd reduction 1n income dis-
parities. It remains to be seen whether the 
benefits will a.etually reach th~ poople 
The Thai economy bas weathered the oil 
crisis, the world recession, and the phaseout. 
of U.S. mll1tary Involvement In Indochln,\ 
Although the ra.te of lnfiatlon "a.s 20 p(rcent 
in 1974, up !rom an average or l percent In 
the yeare before, It has been !alllng 1\n<l 
will probably be down to abot.t 10 perce11t 
!or 1975. Increased ee.rnlngs !rom agricultural 
exports have been a. prime factor ln count.er 4 
lng 011 price lncreasee. The Impart r t both 
tbe recession and the uncertainty ovef 
polltlcal developments In the region have 
been felt In the slackening of foreign Invest-
ment. Tourism, too, ts down. Nevertheles.!! 
Thalll\lld enjoyed a e400 million surplus Ill 
lt.s over-all balance of payment.' In 19H In 
the face of a deficit of $657 mlllion In trade 
The difference WM made up by foreign aid 
oll conceGSion payments, touli;m and capite! 
InfLows. 
The United States has given Thailand largo 
amounts of economic a.Jd over the year . 
much of It In the last decade for the so-railed 
counter-IIl.SUl'gency pro(;l'ams. Thus far. a 
total ot $672 m1111on In economic aid ha' 
been provided by the United States. For fisc • .t 
year 1976, $12 m1lllon has been requeeted • 
In an economy as formidable as Thailand's 
$12 m1111on must be regarded a.s relatively 
Inconsequential. The government's political 
and economic pollclee are the crltlca.l !actor, 
in shaping the nation's future. There would 
appear, therefore, to be little relevance to 
either country In the continuance or the 
bilateral aid program. Indeed the tlme seems 
very propltuous to end thIs vestige ot 
"cllentJsm" and to place the relationship 
or the two nations on & finn plane of n1nt uar 
respe,..t, wlth accent on mutu,\11,. benefirhll 
exchange 
Petroleum. 
TI1t:re are prospects tor major <ilfshort 
petroleum strikes In the Onl! of Slam on 
Thailand's east coast and In the And,lman 
Sea west of the Kra Isthmus. Twenl!·five 
wells have been dr1lled by Arnerlran com-
panies In the Oulf of Slam. on hM been 
found. but the potential Ia not yet ascer-
tainable. There could be international cllt-
.ncultfes ln some areas since mo~t That con-
cessions. overlap In part, territory al•o 
claimed by Cambodia. Thus far. however. 
there has not been any drUllng In disputed 
areas. Some concessions have also bEen 1 ~ 
sued !or the Andaman Sea but work t.here 
Ls not likely to start untU next year. That-
land ha.s already received more than •75 
prospectors. Renewed consideration Is also 
being given by the Thai government to a 
propoet\l to join with Japan In construct-
ing a major pipeline stretching acrose th• 
Kra Llthmus, and terminating in a large 
rennery which would refine Persian Gulf 
crude for shipment to Japan. 
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D"ugs thus far, however, tha• this grouping will 
Thailand Is a major site in the interna- include any type or joint secur!tr .arZ&Ifge-
tional drug problem, not so much 118 a ment. In ~bat sense it would not be a sub-
producer but as the route of transhipment stitute for the SEATO Organl.Ba.tlon which 
of opium brought in from elsewhere tn Prim& Minister Khukrit and President Perdi-
Southeast Asia. Estimates indicate that nand Marc;'?" of the PhUlppines bave urged 
about· 40-45 tons of opium per year are ac- • should be phased out to make it accord. with 
tually produced in Thailand. This level Is new realities In the region." This proposal, It 
sufficient only to meet local demand. ooould be· noted, relates only to the organ-
IZed activities under the Southeast Asian 
Although some Thai officials may still be Treaty an<J the large headquarters staff In 
parties to the drug trade, the. level of In- Bangkok. It does not invqlve a · renunciation 
vol:vement is reported to be much lower of. the aotual treaty, the so-ca.ll.el1 Manll& 
than in the past. Contrary to the s1tuatwn Pact. Thailand 1s the only signatory in the 
ln Burma, drugs do not seem to be a Stgnifi- area., however, to which the Pa.at now has 
c'l.nt source of financial support for in- practical application lnBo!ar as a u.s. secu-
surgents but, rather, a means for per'iOnal rity commitment is concerned. P&l<istan re-
or syndwate enrichment. nounced the treaty ·several years ago and 
Thailand receives equipment fr0m tile the Philippines, Australia, and New zealand, 
United States under the narcotics control are tied to the United Stats by other defense 
program. In fiscal year 1975, $4.8 million arrangements. 
was provided, with $3.7 mlllion more pro- The security relationship between the 
grr.mmed for FY 1976. Bangkok Is a regional United States and Thalland 1s complicated 
headquarters for the U.S. Drug Enforcement by the exlsten~ of the 1962 Rusk-Thanat 
Agency (DEA) which is active throughout communique In which the obligations of the 
Southeast Asia. The agency has a regional Manila Pact were held to l>e both joint and 
budget of $500,000, but the figure does not several. Under that interpretation, It would 
Include assistance to other governments seem, the multilateral SEATO treaty would 
which runs Into the mlllions. There are 26 also amount to a bilateral U.S.-Tbai treaty. 
U.S. agents in Thailand and they are in- Thus, the treaty, potentially, has far more 
volved in operational actions as well as in- signltlcance than the "scrap of p~." as it 
te!llgence gathering. The day before my 1s often called today. An attack, for example, 
anival, fo1· example, U.S. agents and Thai by an enemy In Southeast Asia could con-
police had carried out a joint raid on an ceivably lead to a Thal call on the United 
opium refinery. States to come to Its aid notWltbstandlng 
This sort of u.s. anti-drug acti vities in the disinclination of any other of the signa-
Thailand seems to be highly dubious. Quite tortes to do so. · 
apart from the expenditure of U.S. funds, the The facl> 1s tha·t the ManUs Pact was born 
direct participation by U.S. agents in police of an old and now altifed view of China. It 
activities within Thailand amounts to in- Is of no current relevance to U.S. interests in 
volvement in internal Thai affairs. While it A>lla. Left In abeyance It Is, perhaps, a source 
undoubtedly Is meritorious in objective, it of potential mischief or embarrassment. We 
is a foot-in-the-door, a point of entry which would be well-advised, therefore, to re-
could lead to extensions and in the e1,d, re- examine this agreement forthwith, with a 
newed entrapment in the internal affairs of view to its termination. , 
that nation at renewed cost to the people It should be n,oted in this connection that 
of tile United States. The sorry history of Prime Minister Khukrit has ca.lled for the 
mllltary and economic aid and other ac- complete withdrawal of the 19,000 U.S. mlll-
ti vity In Indochina and Thall and over the tary forces In Thalland by the end ot March 
past two decades should serve as a precau- 1976. Some references, however. have been 
tion in this respect. Pollee actions, includ- made to the possible retention of a standby 
ing local drug enforcement, are functions of capacity at the U Taphao Base, manned by 
Indigenous governments. If there Is a U.S. a small caretaker force. 
role, it should be limited to the exchange of For more than a decf!.de my view has, been 
information and lntelllgence with appropri- that the t1nited States 1,;_ Its own interests 
ate Thai or other officials. Beyond that point, should withdraw mUlt~lly from the South-
U.S. financial assistance for anti-drug op- east Asian mainland "lock stock and barrel " 
erations at whatever level may be set by the It remalna my judg,;,_ent that it is not 1n the 
Congress, in my judgment, 1s best channeled Interest of this nation nor, probably, in the 
through international or reg1onal organlza- interest of Tha.lland to have a u.s. capacity 
tlons. retained at any of the installations In Thai-
Foreign policy and United. States-Thai land. There should be no toe-hold which 
relations would ~erve as a potential source of rein-
President Nixon's trip to Peking and the volvement of U.S. military forces on the 
end of U.S. involvement in Indochina have Southeast Aslan Mainland. 
created a new mllleu for Thai foreign pollcy. LaoS'-Tfu! sands run out 
From direct llnks and Intimate cooperation It has been said that in Laos the French 
with the United States In matters of secu- laid foundations of sand and that we tried 
rlty, Thailand has moved towards a neutral to build on them. As seen from Thailand, 
position. An effort is now being made by the sands ·have run out. Since the fall of 
Bangkok to assure goqd relations with all Cambodia' and · South Vietnam. the Pathet 
the major powers. A case in point was Prime Lao have rapidly expanded their control of 
Minister Khukrit's vlslt to Peking in July Laos. The advance occurred without much 
which resulted In the establishm~nt of diplo- resistance or bloodshed, with the opposition 
matte relations with China. So, too, was the tending to evaporate or flee the country. 
official protest to the United States over the Three of the five government muttary com-
use of Thai bases in the Mayaquez affair. That manders had left the country by early Au-
Incident, moreover, was followed by a de- gust and another left shortly afterwards. 
mand for the complete withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Thailand. 
The outcome ot the Indochina war was not 
only a factor In the new Thai approach to 
China, it also resulted in Intensified Inter-
est In closer association with the Southeast 
Asian nations. Within five months after tak-
Ing office, Khukrlt visited not only Peking 
but a.ll of the ASEAN countries. Tha.lland 
Joined In support of the propoea.l to cre&te 
In Southeast Al!la a zone of "peace, freedom. 
and mrutrallty" which would be guaranteed 
by the great powers. There 1s no indicatio• 
In the caopital of VIentiane, the Pathet 
Lao have also extended their control of the 
coalition central government. Prlnle Minis-
ter Souvanna Phouma Is still In nominal 
command but he Is reported to be virtually 
powerless. The King remains on the throne 
but Is said not to play a political role. Laoa 
is now described as a "Democratic People's 
Kingdom." 
U.S. relations with Laos are stra.lned and 
mlnlma.l following the torcett cl~ng of U.S. 
ald operations last June. The size of the U.S. 
mission dropped from 800 (Including de-
penelen18) in AprU 1915 'to 32 by mid-August. 
It ·Is estlma.te<l ~t there are also some 50 
other Americans without official status re-
mAining In Laos. U.S. IIBS!stance Is not betn;; 
provided to Laos 118 a result or a prohibition 
conta.lnett in the continuing appropriations 
resolution for FY 1916. The new u.s. Am-
ba.s.saclor to .Iiaos has been confirmed by the 
Senate, but u of late-summer had not yet 
boon ordered to hi.s post. In this fashion, " 
U.S. involvement of 22 years which cost bil-
llona ot dollats and many lives is drawing to 
a close·. 
EXactly twenty years ago, in 1955, on tlw 
occasion of a third visit to Laos, I reported to 
the Oemmittee as follows: 
" • • • military aid policies which seek t•) 
do ·more than bulwark the security forceo 
to the point where they can cope with armed 
minorities sud stop occasional border sallies 
seem to me to be highly unrealistic. By the 
same token eeonomic aid programs which at-
tempt to move an ancient past<)ral country 
overnight from the age of the oxcart to tnat 
of the airplane are equally unsound to say 
the least. Both, in attempting to do too 
much;· In my opinlun, can do Incalculable 
harni.. 
"In Laos as ln Cambodia, there has been 
an enormous Increase ln United States ac-
tivity and in the size of the (U.S. official) 
mission during the past year. At the time of 
my first vlslt to Vientiane in 1953, there were 
two Americans In the entire country. Now 
(1955) there are some 45. Accordingly, I rec-
ommend that the Executive Branch, "" in 
the case ot Oa.mbodla. review the extent of 
our activity ln Laos and the size of the mls·· 
slon with a view to keeping both within thr• 
realm of the rea.sonable ... ' 
IV. UNITED STATES-PHII,..IPPINE RELATIONS 
The Philippines have seen Incursions of 
many peopels---Borneans, Indians, Chinese, 
Arabs, Indonesians, Spaniards, Americans 
and others. All have left traces, large and 
small, In the nation's culture. or these, the 
American Is, of course, the most recent and 
one of the strongest. The impact which re-
sulted therefrom Is only now In the process 
of being fully absorbed into the mainstream 
ot Filipino Ute. 
In the sphere of government-to-govern-
ment relations, for example, there are stlll 
u.s. controlled and operated military bases 
In the Philippines. Until very recently, too, 
special trade and Investment arrangements 
. were tn, effect. In these, and in other · ways, 
aspects of the pre-World War II dependent 
relationship were carried over for three dec-
ades In a sort of half-way house to full 
Independence. 
The Republic of ·the Phllipplnes 1s now 
clearly on the final stretch of that course. 
At hom&, the political system transplanted 
from the United States is no longer opera-
tive In its original form. Abroad, what was 
once a.n almost automatic concurrence in 
the course ot U.S. foreign policy has been 
replaced by a pursuit ot independent Phlllp-
plne national objectives. Whlle not . aban-
doning defense agreements with the United 
States, Phlllpplne foreign policy 1s presently 
aimed at establishing good relations wl th 
all the great powers and stronger coopera-
tives arrangements In Southeast Asia, as 
well as with other developing nations. 
Foreign policy and United States-Philippine 
relations 
While the sudden end of the U.S. Involve· 
ment In Indochina appears to have pro-
duced thi<l sh1tt In Philippine foreign policy, 
the fact Is that- the changes have been un-
derway tor a long time, In a larger per-
spective, they can be seen to emerge from 
the sense of Phlllppine nationalism and 
A>lian identity which has been growing for 
many yearn. Heretofore, these inner forces 
were not readily percel ved because of the 
Footnotes at end ot article. 
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pent t..nce o! strang element& o! tb6 prior 
depeoden~ relaUonahlp wUb tbe Urilled 
St&U>e. Therefore, a Ia more aecurate, m 
my Ju~nt, to atate that It Ia DOt 1bat 
the Ftllplnoe are loelng conftc1enoe 1n the 
United S ~ aa some have eontell~; but, 
rath r thl!.t they are gaining contldence lu 
themselves. 
In a speech on May ~. 1976, Pre$14ent 
F~rdlna.nd E. Marcoe outlined th- guide-
lines for a new foreign policy: 
"l"'rst, to lnten.slty, a.long a broader .fteld, 
onr relations with the members of ABEAN; 
"Second, to pul'tiue more vigorously the 
.,.tabllstonent of dlplomaUo relaUons wtth 
Socla.ilst statee. In particular with the Peo-
ple'a Republic of China and with the Soviet 
Union: 
-rhlrd, to seek closer ldenWicatlon with 
the Third World with whom we share elm-
liar problems; 
"Fourth, to contluue our beueficla.l rela-
tlollllhlp with Japan; 
"FUth. to support the Arab countries In 
their struggle !nr a Just and enduring pea<:e 
In the Middle East; and 
"Finally. to .ftnd a new basis, compatible 
with the emerg:ng real1tles In Asia, for a oon-
tlnutng healthy relationship with the United 
St&tes." 
As a result of a visit to Peking by Preel-
dent Marcos In June, 1976, the Republic of 
the Philippines est&bllshed diplomatic re-
lations v.'lth China. Such tlee o.lBo exist with 
all of the Communist nations of Eastern 
Europe, except Albania and the Soviet Union 
and formalization of relations with the lat-
ter expected to be only a matter of Ume. 
ElTorts are being made to est.abllsh rela-
tion.. with euccessor governmente In Indo-
china. At the time of my visit, however, the 
new government In Cambodia had not re-
sponded to a Philippine stAtement of recog-
nition. Talks hnve been under way In Pl!.rls 
on the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with North VIetnam but Initiatives have not 
yet been taken on the resumption of relations 
"'ltb Saigon. 
The Philippines Is a stroni: supporter of 
ASEAN which Is eeen as something of a !ul-
~rum . Through this medium, :ManUa Is seek-
Ing greater cooperation on economic mat-
ters &nd the creation of a "zone of peace, 
freedom, and neutrallt y" In Southeast Asia. 
The Republic Is also moving to eetabllsh 
better relations with other Third World na-
tions. One a.spect of pollcy bears a relation-
ship to the Muslim problem In the south 
since the :Middle Ea.etern nations are aym-
pathetlc to their co-religionists In the Philip-
pine•. They are also the source of most of 
the petroleum used In the Republic. In 
Saudi Arabia, an Impression waa conveyed 
that the Arab states were prepared to do 
" h at they could to promote a reconciliation 
between the Musllms and Manlla. 
In Philippine eyes as well aa In Thailand's 
the SEATO organization has outlived Jl.:! 
uu!ulness. However. tlte question of the 
. ianlla ract baa not yet been addres,;ed, al-
t hough It adds little to Philippine security 
since It ove rlaps the bilateral Mutual Secu-
rity Treaty with the United State'!. 
President Marcoe baa oa.lled for a reexaml-
nMion of a.ll U.S.-PbUlpplne security ar-
r:mgementa . Thee& arrangements consist of a 
Military Ba.ae Agreement which dates from 
1 1!7 a.ltd runs until 1991 , a Mutua.! Security 
Treaty entered Into ln 1952, and a 19~ MIU-
tary AM!s an~e Agreament which !Of'ms the 
framework !or the U.S . mU!tary &.1<1 pro-
G m . The stress of the Pre.ldent's propoeal 
• on tho base accords.• 
As a P;t,elQc nation. the United Stat... has 
1 ttereets In the region which are aa ext&n· 
• \e as th e ocea.n ; retention of tbo mutua.! 
<."Urlty trta.ty with the Philippines Ia. pr-
ently, a major element In the mUit.ry pro-
t.<>Ctlon of thO<Oe lnterl.'6ts. Oon•ereely, Phlllp-
ptne securJ•y comee under the umbrella of 
Footnotes at end of article. 
the tame trea.ty. There te no desire on our 
part or on the part ot l4anJl& to terminate 
th1a accord. I1 anythl.nc. the latter'• oonoeru 
Ia thAt operation of tbe pact be more auto-
matic. In thls oonnectlon, the tonttnued 
preeence of U.s. forces at Clark Field and the 
Sublc Ba.y Nava.l Bue doee act a.s something 
of an assurance of our Immediate involve-
m ent In any attack on the l.slanda. 
The Air Force Base at Clark Field , 52 miles 
north ot Manila. spreads over 131,000 acres, 
mak1ng It greater tn size than the combined 
area of a.ll US. a.lr bases outalde the conti-
nental United St&tea. It covers such a. vast 
area that squatters operating aurreptltloualy 
are s.ald to ba.ve raloed an e~tlm&ted e10 mil-
lion worth of sugar cane on base Ianda laat 
yoor. The Sublc Bay Nava.l Base comple% oc-
cupies 36,000 acres of land and encompaBBeS 
26,000 acres of water. Much of the land with-
tn the boundaries of both basee Is not used 
!or direct military purpoaes. 
Fl!teen thousru1d U.S. servicemen are sta-
tioned at the bnsee, and they are supple-
mented by 47,000 Filipino employeee. The 
197~ budget !or Clark and Sublc wa.s t232 
mllllon. The bases represent a maJor ln'I'Mt-
ment !Of' the United States, a maJor p&yroll 
tar the Philippines and the prtnclpa.l current 
Issue between the two oountr!es. 
The M&nlla government has announced 
that 1n negotiations for a new base as-
men t, It ...Ul be guided by theee prlnclplee: 
to give added lmpetua to Pblllpplne eelf-re-
llance, to enhance respect for the territoriAl 
Integrity and sovereignty of the Phlllpptnes 
and to help ma.lntaln a ba.lance of power m 
the region. The Unl ted Staetea hae acknowl-
edged PhUipplne sovereignty over the bee& 
area but, In !act, oontlnues to exercise aspects 
of eoverelgnty. Theee carry-overs ol the form-
er oolonlal relationship are a major point at 
lseue. What concerns the Phlllpplnee WM 
clearly st&ted by President Marcoe on July 7, 
1975. 
•·we want to put an end to the practice of 
ext ra-territoriality In our country In keeping 
"ltb our dignity as a. sovereign Republic and 
In keeping with the developments of our 
times. We want to 1188ume control of a.11 U.S. 
bases and put them to a productive eco-
nomic, ae well na mUltary use." 
Negotiation of a. new status !or the basoo, 
from the PbUlpplne potnt of view, Involve 
three matn Issues . ( 1) ''l"'llpln1za.tJon" of 
the bases or elimination of extra-territorial 
carry-overs; ( 2) use of portions of the bases 
for oo=erclal purposes and economic de-
velopment which can be on a Joint bnsts; and 
(3) return of portloUB o! the bnse Ianda. 
D1lllcult negotlatlona may be ahead. It 
should be reiterated, however, that the 
Phlllpptnes government etre.'8&S that It has 
no desire to embarrass the United Statee. 
Nor, lt should be added, do tbe U.S. com-
mands at the baaes fall to recogniZe that the 
old days ot the dependency are over. Our 
!orees can rema.ln usefully In the Phlllpplnes 
only If their preaence accords with today'a 
rea.!Jtles which Include a heightened sense of 
Philippine nationalism and a s trong em-
phAsil on eelt-rel!ance . 
On the part of th<l Philippin e.•, there Is 
contemporary value tn the contribution 
which the ba8ee can continue to mnke to 
Philippine 1!8CU.l'lty, to regional lllablllty, and 
to the eeonomy. On the part of the United 
Bt&~ the baaee, as noted, are elements In 
the defense of the United States and Its In-
terests tn the Pacific. The need Is for a new 
relationship which will reJ'lect these mutual 
ln\t!reeta In the llght or altered c!rcum-
&taneee. II bon> ti.S . and Filipino olllc1al.8 
approe.cb the negotiations with a rea.llatlc 
undenJtandlng of their own and each otber·a 
neede, there Ia every reason to expect that a 
aatv.r..ctory agreement enn be reached 
promptly. 
Politlcaland uonomlc 1ltuatlon 
The Philippines has been governed under 
martJallaw since 1972. Preak1ent Marcos, who 
..... ~-.ow under 'lhe old VJI. l!pOn· 
--s. . hu 'eet"'fed as eiiJ&f a-
ecaUM - lllel Ria announced !'0"1 ., 
the troo.........,. ola N.,.. Society, l!eearlbed .., 
one '"loUJided on -1&1 )u.stlce, the equal 
sbartng Of Ule I.Dc1'emen te of de'l'elopmen t. 
an4 p&JiMipa wry democra.cy" wt th refomu; 
In Ule ..,._ ol "peace and order; land r&-
torm; e""nomlo c!e-..klpment; the enhance-
ment of ...,..I value&; government reorgn-
nlmtton; educational reforms, and eoclal 
aervkea. • Although the Preeklent has not 
annoa:nud plana to create a l'latlona.l As· 
eembly u e.lled !or under a new 1973 Con-
stltullllon, pJebMeltee have been experimented 
with !rom time to time In rorms adapted from 
old lndlgenOUII political practices. The Presi-
dent recently re!errtll1 to the poeslblll:ty of 
!ormtng an appointed eoneultatlve body, a 
Legl.alatlve Ad1'18ory Council. 
There Is no Indication or when martlal law 
will end. Nor are there any Indications of a 
broad public demand !or Ita termination. 
VIsible evidences of martial Ia w are few; 
thel'll are far !ewer uniforms. !or example, on 
the streets of J.fanlla than on those or Waah-
lngton. For an practlca.l purposes, the sys-
tem amounts to rule by Presidential decree, 
with curbs on civil llbertiM. While the Catho-
llc hierarchy, ae such, Ja not actively aligned 
against martial law. some opposition does 
oome from eegments of the Church, particu-
larly thO<Oe which Include a. number of for-
eign clergy. A few members of the proscribed 
legislature are a.lso outspoken critics. So, 
too, are oert.a1n old Plllplno families of great 
wealth whose holdings and lnJ'luence have 
been drMtlca.lly curta.lled and who charge 
that theee prerequleltes have been sblited 
to others. In genera.!, however, the Improve-
ments tn pubUe safety and economic well-
being which are .._,.,lated with martial law 
have won, at a. minimum, general acquies-
cence. 
-There are two ~or Insurgency problems 
In the Philippine.~. Both have roots which 
streteh back Into pre-Independence days. One 
Is the New People's Army (NPA). It Ia a 
guerrUia. orpnbatlon based on Luzon which 
has an ldeologlca.l bnse derived from Chin-
communism. Ita baalc armed etrengtb Ja es-
timated at 1,800. There Is also the Muslim 
rebelllon In the south centered In Western 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. 
The rebellion traces back to ancient dis· 
pules between the Musllml! who first occu-
pied Mlnda.Da.o In the 12th Century and the 
Christiana who arrived centuries later. It 1.1 a 
controversy which baa been fueled tn recent 
yeara by aid to the lnBurgente !rom Libya and 
Sabah and by encroachments on Muslim 
Ianda from an expanding Christian popula-
tion Intent tn economic development. EBtl-
matel Indicate that there are at least 6.000 
Musllma under arms. The tnaurgency Is a een-
sltlve Issue for the government tntern&lly 
since Musllml! make up about 7 percent ·or 
the popula.tlon. There Is also concern ov« 
sympathy for the rebele !rom abroad which 
might lead to en<k>l'8elllent or a more a.ctlvlst 
policy by Mu.ollm nat1one, especially tboee In 
a position to cut oJI ln06t of the petroleum 
supply of the lsla.nda. 
The Philippine mllltary, which takes 15 
percent or the natlona.l budget, hM more 
than doubled tn al.7.e largely because of the 
rebelllon. About 80 percent or the combat 
forcee are t1e<l up tn the eou t h where they are 
suffering subat&ntlal attrltlon. About 76 were 
I<Uied In action monUl.ly durmg the 11.rat half 
of this year. Accord InS to U.S . olllcl.als, n.o 
U.S. military penonael are permitted to go 
Into the COIIlbat- and no U B. penonnel 
are ln...,I'Oed 1n Ute m!Mtary situation. 
In Saudi A»abta, ae noted, mc!leatlons were 
recehed of t»e poaatblllty of a negotiated 
settlement of the Insurrection. It wns oald 
that agreement on a oease-tlre btnged on 
autonomous at.aLua for Muslim areaa wlthln 
the Republic and a government-sponsored 
program of e:rtena.lve eoclal Improvements. As 
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of this writing, however, the government and 
the rebels seem as far apart as ever on the 
specifics of autonomy. Nor Is there much 
likelihood of .social and economto improve-
ments being carried out in any su'betantie.l 
way while fighting Is In progress. 
Notwit hstanding these internal difficulties, 
the performance of the Philippines' economy 
reflectS considerable improvement over past 
years. The 34 percent rate of Inflation in 1974 , 
has declined drastically. Food prices a.re In-
creasing now at an annual rate of only 6.5 
percent whlle non-food prices are going up 
by 8.4 percent. By conservative appraisals, it 
is expected that the overall rate in 1976 .will 
be 15-20 percent. 
The Phllippine government takes an active 
role in the economy which includes the plan-
ning of development and the imposition of 
price controls on some commodities. The 
reliance on imports is still heavy in order to 
meet consumer needs but t his is expected to 
change as the new stress on independence 
and self-reliance extends more deeply into 
the nation's economtc life. Last year exports 
were $2.7 billion and imports $3.1 b!llion. 
Nevertheless, the year ended with a $60 mtl-
Hon favorable over-all balance of payments 
due to toreign capitalinfiow, foreign aid and 
tourism. It Is estimated that the trade deficit 
for 1975 may reach $700 mlll!on, due in large 
measure to the decllne in sugar prices and 
depressed market conditions for coconut 
products and lumber and the increase in the 
prices of imported i terns. 
Japan is the leading exporter to the Phllip-
pines and the United States is second with 
23 percent of the market. Forty-three percent 
of Philippine exports go to the United States 
and In 1974 they produced for that nation a 
favorable bllateral balance of $400 million. 
Private and official u.s. credits to the Phlllp-
pines total nearly· $3 blll!on U.S. equity in-
vestments have an estimated market value ot 
$2 billion. 
The expiration of the Laurel-Langley 
Agreement in July, 1974 ended all remaining 
bilateral tariff preferences with the Ph!l!p-
pines. At the same time, U.S. firms lost their 
exemptions from general Philippine restric-
tions on foreign investment:. This adjust-
ment has been brought about without major 
problems and U.S. firms are reported to be 
doing well in the new situation. Negotiations 
have not yet commenced on a new treaty of 
commerce but the way has now been cleared 
by the passage o! the 1974 Trade Act. 
The Philippines receives assistance, mostly 
loans, from the United States and from inter-
national institutions. U.S. economic aid 
totaled $56 mtllion In fiscal year 1975. At the 
same time, the World Bank provided $209 
mllllon in loans and Is expected to furnish 
$260 million for FY 1976. Assistance is also 
provided through the Asian Development 
Bank which is headquartered in Manila., with 
some $100 mlllion expected from the Bank in 
the current fiscal year. 
While foreign investment Is welcomed, it is 
admitted on a. selective basis which Is de-
signed to enhance economic self-rel!a.nce and 
balanced development. Except In unusual 
circumstances, such as in newly opened areas, 
rorelgn equity is limited to 40 percent. 
There is stU! a great gap in living stand-
ards between urban and rural areas. However, 
emphasis in development is being put on 
the rural areas and there are indications that 
its share of natlone.l Income Is Increasing. 
With one of the highest birth rates in the 
world, the Phillppine population Is growing 
rapidly. From 20 mlllion at the time of In-
dependence in 1946 the Increase has been to 
42 million today and the total could reach 
100 million by the end of the century. A ma-
jority of the country's population Is under 16 
years of age. In practical terms, the growth 
rate each year means 2 m11J1on mouths to 
feed and a. requirement for 600,000-700,000 
new jobs. 
Petroleum 
Exploration for petroleum oll'ers the poa-
slbll!ty of adding a strong stimulus to the 
Phll!ppines economy. Thirteen major groups, 
prlma.rlly Flllpino-U.S. joint ventures, hold 
concessions both onshore and offshore not-
ably in the sea. west of the Island of Pe.la.wa.n. 
No strikes have yet been reported but exten-
sive test-drllling has not yet taken place 
so It Is too early to estimate the Pt'ospects. 
All of the country's requirements of 70 
million barrels of·crude per day are now Im-
ported. The Mideast Is the major source but 
increased amounts are coming from other 
sources such as Barawak, Indonesia., and the 
People's Republic of China.. Whatever the 
outcome of its own petroleum exploration, 
the Pblllppines intends to achieve Independ-
ence from fossll fuels through development of 
geo-thermal resources and nuclear power. It 
Is expected that this goe.l will be reached 
on the main Island of Luzon by 1985. 
Summary 
In summary, the Phlllpplne Republic is ex-
periencing a period of growing national as-
sertion and economic progress. At the same 
time, Its ties with the United States which 
go back three quarters of a century are in 
transition. What Is Involved In this transi-
tion of principal concern to the United 
States are the vestiges of the previous de-
pendency relationship which, in my judg-
ment, no longer accord with the enduring in-
terests of either nation. There Is a need for 
a reshaping of attitudes and arrangements 
which will reflect the changes that have 
taken place within the Phlllpplnes and in the 
Pacific and tbe world. The future of the 
Philippines Is bright and so, too, can be the 
outlook for continjled cooperation and bene-
ficle.l interchange with the United States If 
the adjustments which are now required are 
made in good time and are managed with 
sensitivity and understanding--on both 
sides. 
V, POSTSCRIPT 
China's petroleum potential 
Reference has been made throughout this 
study to petroleum developments in the reg-
Ion of Southeast Asia.• Far more significant, 
are the developments associated with the 
People's Republic of China.. There Is wide-
spread interest In the subject and It bas 
prompted this postscript whlob Is based on 
the latest Informat ion which was made avail-
able to me during the course of the mission. 
It supplements observations derived from 
my last visit to China In 1974 which were 
reported to the Committee In January 1975.' 
Since that time, there have been additional 
lndlcatlons that China may soon emerge as 
the world's next great oil producer. No one, 
not even the Chinese , know the country's 
full petroleum potential, either onshore or 
offshore. Outside experts agree, however, that 
It Is vast with estimates of reserves ranging 
from 30 billion to 60 billion barrels. China's 
peak production before 1949 was slightly 
more than 300,000 tons annually but by 
1970 It had increased to 18 mtlllon tons. 
In recent years production has grown by 
more than 20 percent annually and in 1976 
ts likely to exceed 80 m!lllon metric tons. 
This rate of increase Is expected to continue 
for at least the next five years. If this proves 
to be the case, 1980 production will be about 
three times the 1973 level. One observer · 
wrote recently that "Peking appears likely 
to reach the current production level of 
Saudi Arabia by 1988 or hereafter," • (i.e., 
some 8 m1llion barrels a. day or 400 mtllion 
tons a year). As much as half of that output 
could be available for export, a. formidable 
factor in relationships with the oil-hungry 
nations of the world. 
China. Is expected to export 8 mlllion tons 
Footnotes at end of article. 
of oU to Japan In 1975, and sme.Iler, quanti-
ties to th~ Philippines, Thailand, North Ko-
rea., &114 North Vietnam. Exporte to the 
Phlllpplnea are continuing at a. rate of 14, 
000 barrels per day and additional sales may 
be made to The.lla.nd. Some dll!lculty has 
been encountered In refining Chinese crude 
to Japan, the Phlllpplnes, and Thailand 
where existing equipment Is not designed to 
ha.n<Ue the high wax content. 
New fields onshore In China. are being 
brought In and drilllng Is proceeding at sev-
eral offshore loca.ttcm.s. Although there have 
been no announcements or offshore discover-
Ies by the Chinese, some observers believe 
that the drilling now in progrt\ss is as much 
for the purpose of mastering technlq ues as 
it Is to find oil. Drilling has been under way 
in th\) Po Hal Gulf for two years and com-
menced late last year In the Yellow Sea near 
Shanghai, with a Chinese built rig. 
There has also been activity on one of the 
Paracel Islands, claimed by both Vietna.ms 
a1,1d_ some prospecting around Ha.lnan Island: 
An oil potential exists in th«t Senkaku Is-
lands area which lle north of Taiwan and are 
claimed by China., Japan, and Taiwan. Ap-
parently, there has been no drllling by Amer-
Ican companies in any area disputed by 
Japan. 
There Is not only a great potential for oil 
along the continental shelf of Asia but also 
much potential for trouble in view of the 
many overlapping cla,ms. Thus far, the 
United Sta.tee has stayed out of these con-
flicts and, should continue to do so. In my 
judgment, an essential element of our pol-
icy, Is to discourage private U.S. prospecting 
in any areas In significant International 
dispute. 
Excerpts from ,my January 1975 report to 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
concerning ·China's oil situation are re-
printed below: 
Petroleum 
In 1973 China entered the International 
oil market with the sale of one m!lllon tons 
of crude oil to Japan and, In th& following 
year, entered Into arrangements for substan. 
tie.! shipments to tp.e Philippines. The lat-
ter commitment was made in conjunction 
with the well-received visit of Mrs. Imelda 
Romualdez Marcos, the wife of the Philip-
pine's President. 
China. has been self-sufficient In petrol-
eum since 1966 and for several years prior to 
the 1973 sale to Japan, had been exporting 
petroleum products to North Vietnam, North 
Korea, and Albania.. The Chinese are now 
looking to crude oil as a. major earner of 
foreign exchange, to help finance increased 
imports of industrial plants and equipment. 
The old slogan, "oil for the lamps of China," 
used by Western traders to exploit China for 
so long, has been given an Ironic twist. 
The continental shelf off China's shore, 
particularly the areas between Taiwan and 
Japan and under the Yellow Sea, are consid-
ered by many petroleum experts to contain 
soq>.e of the richest oil reserves in the world. 
China. 's coastllne extends from the Bay of 
Korea In the North to the Gulf of Tonkin in 
the South and the, continental shelf slopes 
gently out as far as 200 miles In some places. 
No one really knows how great the offshore 
potential is since exploration began only 
recently. Deep sea. drilling rigs have been 
bought from Japan and additional explora-
tion equipment has been purchased from 
the United States and other countries. How-
ever, most of the petroleum technology being 
used to develop China's oil resources, off-
shore and on land, is China's own. China re-
cently ann.ounced, for example, the bringing 
In of Its first offshore well In the Yellow 
Sea., using a rig bullt In a Shanghai shipyard. 
There will be thorny International prob-
lems In developing some of the offshore oil 
potential along Asia's periphery. Following 
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the publl on ot the r U.lt ol a 1968 Unlt.ed 
Nation a sponsored geopby&lcal aur<ey ot the 
ChlnA!5e conUnental abel!, Taiwan, Japan 
and South Korea each advan ed o'erlapplllg 
claims to parts or the region In December 
1070 th• I eople's Rcpu lie !J sued Its claim 
to the contlneotal shelf and to owner&hlp or 
Ule Scnkaltu It>LJ.nds, although the latter are 
alllO claimed by Japan and Talv. an. WhUe 
U.S policy Is to lend no encour •gement to 
exp ra•ton In the dl puted areas, some u.s. 
companies hi\\C obtained conce :;)tons !rom 
Tal,.an. Specifically, tbe'le e<•rporatlons are 
Oul!, Amoco, ca.noco, Oceanic, Clinton and 
Tex1 I Several or the concessions lle oft the 
Sen.kuus However, no U.S. drllilng opera -
tiona have yet been conducted In that area 
but Amoco. Gull and Conoco have been In-
volved In c!rllllng otr the west coast ot Taiwan 
1n the Taiwan a~nLits, with the work being 
done by Amerlcan-o..,'tled vessels o! foreign 
r eg\lltry and manned by foreign creWB. There 
h ave been no U.S. Government Investment 
&uaranteea 1 ued !or these drllllng opera -
t.lona. 
Tbere 1s also an oll potential In the Paracel 
Island s, southeast o! VIetnam, claimed by 
both South VIetnam and China but occupied 
aolely by China. In tact, the People'• Repub-
llc bad a drilling rlg on one of the !&lando at 
t he time or a mllltary encounter there be -
t ween the two co11ntr les In 1974. There are 
also confilctlng elalm.B of China, South Vlet-
na.m, the Phlllpplnea and Taiwan to the 
Spratly Iolanda which al&o lie to the south-
er.st ot VIetnam. With oll reserves an ln-
enaslngly Important Mset, overlapping 
claims oft the Asian 11 t torals con taln the 
seeds or very ser1ous dl11lcultles. While the 
Unlt.ed States should not shirk participation 
tn International etl'orts to deal In a rational 
way with these dlmcultles, we should not 
provide j~overnment Incentives or otherwise 
lend encourngement to companies which 
w!ab to pl11nge ahead with exploration and 
development Itt disputed areas. 
In addlt.on to an offshore potential, China 
has very promising Internal oll b~ar1ng 
basins. In fact, the main emphRsls Is stlll on 
land exploration. Estimates or China's total 
,..,..rves hi\\ e been consistently revised up-
wards over tl•e !aRt ten years. Even approxi-
mate llgur<' on how much oll China may 
have are not available The general view, 
however, Is thnt the potential Is very great. 
I was Informed that ChIna's oll production 
was now "In the aarne range ""Algeria's, per-
haps a little mort'" Chinese output Is In-
creasing at the rate o! twenty percent an-
nually, If thla rate I rnalntslned, It would 
pu h production to over 400 million tons by 
1984, comp!>red with an estimated 60 mllllon 
p lus tono In 1074, making China a major fac-
tor tn the v;orld petroleum trade. 
China sol<! 5 million tons ot crude oll to 
Japan In 1974, earning about $450 mllllon, 
and Is aald to have committed 10 mllllon tons 
tor 1975. Smaller amount• hM e been sold to 
Ule Phlllpplnes and Thalland There are al&o 
reports that China has otrcred to sell oll to 
U «. compan•c Chinn' 197~ petroleum ex-
port8 are ~xpectect to be double the 1974 level 
anti to continue to cllmb as new produc lon 
comes ln. Output Is limited only by a short-
•e of equipment and tmru<port 
Some pertluent polnt8 about China's oil 
export potentlnl 1\re brought O\lt by the fol-
lowing eJ< erpt !rom a r cent analysis: 
" Pelting plans to expand oll exports mb-
•tantlally durtng the next nve years are borne 
o 1t by the con truct!on ot new oll-handllnt; 
f<><'llltles nt the ports of Cllln-hu!lng- tao nnd 
Tlllngtao nd the purchase of dredging equip-
ment needed to make Chine e ports deep 
enough l.:>r large tankPn ot more than !50,000 
owr to transport oll tor export. The tonnage 
ot tankers In Ule Cbln !n matlonal neet 
h!\8 doubled In the put year nnd now tot Is 
al~$ 200,000 DWT. 
"Tbe goal o! 110 mWI01> tons ot erude oil 
!or el!p<ll't In 1980 appeaza !eae!bla. Reserves 
are large enough , even without P1'Q4uc tlon 
!rom oltsbore Jlelds. I! production acoeieratea, 
or e ven l:f It only con tlnues to grow at 22 
percent--the rate achieved dur1ng 1965--
1972-the PRC coUld export 50 million tons 
In 1980 and etlll pro~lde a generons leeway 
t or usiAg oll to modernize the economy." 
As a developing country, China needs In-
creasing a moaats of ~roleum Tbe potential 
!or ""port, therefore, may not be as great as 
It seems a t !lrst glan ce although It should 
be rubstlmtlal because the Chlneee do not 
use energy or any other commodity !or that 
matter m a wa•tetul or prorugate manner. 
I n deed, I! the United Sta~ followed. even a 
par t of tbe Chinese practices In the use of 
petr-.m, t his nat loll>' would be more than 
self -su.!llclen t . 
Blghty percent ot Ch-'s energy Is pro-
duced trom ooal, a11d ""'"' reserves are ""tl-
mated to be one-tbii'O!t of the world'll total. 
Every provtnoe has aome coal. Lllte ott, coal 
remains larply unexplolt.ed a n d could even-
tually becom e a major export earn.,..• 
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